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a b s t r a c t
Monetary and ﬁscal institutions have played a decisive role in the stabilisation of the Brazilian economy
since themid-1990s. In Brazil institutional reformswere predominantlymade in response to a succession
of internal and, particularly, external crises. Brazil’s experience of designing and managing institutions
to this end is likely to be of interest to other emerging and low- or middle-income economies. As such,
the Brazilian experience offers many lessons to be learned, both in the sense of what could be done and
what is better avoided.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to highlight the origins and evolution of
ﬁscal and monetary institutions in Brazil and the central role this
played in the containment of inﬂation. From this evaluation clear
policy lessons can be derived which may have wider relevance to
other countries in LatinAmerica, and indeedbeyond the region. The
lessons center on, among other issues, the implications of institu-
tional reform for management of public and private ﬁnances, and
the implementationofmonetarypoliciesdirectly aimedatensuring
price stability.
∗ Corresponding author at: Caixa Postal 62588, Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22250-
970, Brazil. Tel.: +55 21 2147 0135.
E-mail address: jose.afonso@fgv.br (J.R. Afonso).
More than 20 years have now elapsed since Brazil embarked
on a far-reaching macroeconomic stabilisation program, the Real
plan. Despite the recent slowdown of the Brazilian economy and a
rise in inﬂationary pressure, what remains incontestable has been
the long term success of the Plan in bringing about greater price
stability, and thus laying the foundations forpoverty alleviationand
a less sharply skewed distribution of income. While the economic
basis of the plan has been widely discussed in the literature, far
less analysed – andof vital importance –have been the institutional
reformswhich underpinned the success of the counter-inﬂationary
policy measures adopted.
The creation of the present currency (the Real) in 1994 may be
considered a watershed moment. Previously Brazil’s was an econ-
omy marked by hyperinﬂation, and which had already undergone
a moratorium on foreign debt and seizure of internal savings, and
which suffered fromadistinct lack of ﬁscal discipline. Following the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.005
1062-9769/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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introduction of the Real, Brazil’s economy ultimately settled into
controlled inﬂation and rebalanced external and public accounts
(Giambiagi, 2008). In1999, as theexchange rateanchorofmonetary
policywas abandoned, a systemof inﬂation targetswas introduced.
From then on, the so-called “macroeconomic tripod” became a key
factor. This combined three monetary and ﬁscal policies: (i) a ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate; (ii) an inﬂation targeting system; and (iii) a
primary surplus target. In parallel, theBrazilian governmentunder-
took a modernisation of its institutions. This assisted the process
of ﬁscal adjustment through such measures as privatisation and
control of sub-national government expenditure.
The ﬁrst feature of the Brazilian macroeconomic ‘tripod’ com-
prises a shift from a system of semi-ﬁxed exchange rates to a
managed ﬂoating exchange rate. It is notable that, by adopting the
ﬂoating exchange rate, the Central Bank of Brazil regained con-
trol of monetary policy and the exchange rate became the variable
responsible for absorbing external shocks. The inﬂation target sys-
temwas regulatedby theuse of a high level of interest rate (Sistema
Especial de Liquidac¸ão e de Custódia – SELIC), which ampliﬁed the
differential between Brazilian and foreign interest rates, attracting
and contributing to the appreciation in value of the national cur-
rency. The third aspect concerns ﬁscal policy. After the signing of
two agreements with the International Monetary Fund at the end
of the 1990s, Brazil put in place a ﬁscal system with targets for the
primary surplus, with the aim of maintaining public debt stability
and giving the government credibility, thus enabling it to reduce
the interest rate paid on public borrowing at a later date.
In this arrangement, ﬁscal and monetary policies have acted
together to achieve planning goals. In this paper, we aim to high-
light the origins of the most notable features of current ﬁscal and
monetary institutions in Brazil, and to analyse their impact on the
recent development of Brazilian economic policy. The papermainly
follows the evolution of these institutional arrangements chrono-
logically. The argument is supported some monetary and ﬁscal
statistics included in the main text itself.
This paper is organised as follows. Following this introduction
wepresent a brief historical contextualisation of Brazil‘smacroeco-
nomic institutions, tracing their evolution from the 19th century
through to the Real Plan. Next, the paper explores the changes
in monetary institutions that followed the Real Plan, highlighting
the role of the tripod, while the subsequent section analyses the
ﬁscal institutions, focusing on the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The
concluding section, considers the challenges posed by the current
slowdown in Brazil and the broader policy lessons that may be
drawn.
2. Brief historical contextualisation of Brazil’s
macroeconomic institutions
Brazil is a huge, diverse, and complex country, and one whose
society and economy was for a long time somewhat insulated from
the rest of the world. As such, important developments in its ﬁscal
and monetary institutions have tended to occur for internal rea-
sons, and can be traced a long way back into the country’s history.
Since independence in 1822, and the subsequent formation
in the nineteenth century of the ﬁrst the Empire and later the
Republic, the political organisation of Brazil has taken the form of
a federation in which the governments of the states have played
a very important role. In particular this encompassed the devel-
opment of basic infrastructure (the states built and controlled the
ﬁrst great ports, railways and banks). Political cycles, alternating
between dictatorial and democratic governments, had something
of a pendulumeffect on the extent of federal power, as Brazil swung
betweenperiodsofﬁscal andﬁnancial centralisationanddecentral-
isation. Over the course of time, municipal governments gradually
gained more and more inﬂuence in the federation (Serra & Afonso,
2007a), to the point where they now occupy the position previ-
ously enjoyed by the state governments, controlling basic social
expenditure, such as those on education andhealth, aswell as town
planning.
The handling of government affairs and accounts also presents
an interesting picture. An all-inclusive code of public accountability
had already been introduced in 1920. Later, after a parliamentary
initiative of 1950 and considerable debate, a basic budget act was
published in 1964. This act arguably was revolutionary; expen-
diture began to be recorded on an accrual basis, a principle only
adopted by governments of rich countries decades later. The act
sought to integrate plan and budget, and to budget with ﬁnancial
and equity management, through the publication of differentiated
and circumstantiated balances.
However, the value of this new and sophisticated budgeting and
accounting system was eroded over time by a number of factors.
Firstly, it suffered from the open exceptions by the governments
of the military dictatorship, which went on to approve the budget
proposal in parliament over a period of time, excluded the public
debt and many budget expenses, and used state banks – even the
central bank – to assume costs and reduce debts. Secondly, hyper-
inﬂation diminished the effects of the changes and of the equity
positions themselves.
It is important to understand the context of the military gov-
ernment that came to power in Brazil in 1964, and which adopted
a series of economic reforms that, in essence, laid the foundations
for the institutions that have shaped the Brazilian macroeconomy
up to the present day. Indeed, although designed under an exclu-
sive political regime and for an economy largely sealed off from
the outside world, it is curious how, almost half a century later, the
foundations forBrazil’s tax system,banking systemandadministra-
tive system remain predominantly the same. A dictatorship can use
exceptional means – i.e. means not ordinarily available to demo-
cratic regimes – to impose reforms that reﬂect a technical ideal,
even if they fail to meet the expectations of most of the popula-
tion. Of course, this is not to say that dictatorship is the quickest or
most efﬁcient way to modernise institutions; it is merely to record
the historical fact that in 1960s Brazil military governments took
the opportunity to undertake genuine structural reforms to public
ﬁnances, creating new and consistent institutions that were rea-
sonably solid and close in form to those recommended by theory
based on the experiences of other countries. These changes were
motivated by national decisions (at that time, Brazil did not need
help from, or monitoring by, multilateral bodies), albeit decisions
originating with different people and interests. During the military
dictatorship the reforms were, without question, in line with plans
and strategies that had been designed in advance and implemented
rigorously (even by force).
The 1960s was also a time of major institutional change related
to monetary policy, with reforms having already begun in 1964.
In that year, the Brazilian economy recorded the highest inﬂation
rates in history, rising 25% in theﬁrst quarter alone (in termsof geo-
metric progression an inﬂation of 144% a year). In this context, the
Government Economic Action Plan (Plano de Ac¸ão Estratégica do
Governo – PAEG) was launched, with the aim of promoting stabili-
sation and a return to growth, and eliminating external restrictions
on the Brazilian economy.
The ﬁght against inﬂation had chronological priority over the
other objectives of the Plan, not because monetary stability was
more important than the objectives of growth and balance of pay-
ments, but because it would not be possible for the country to
developwhile on the brink of hyperinﬂation. The possibility of eco-
nomic recovery, then, lay in inﬂation control, elimination of price
distortions accumulated in the past, and in modernising capital
markets, leading to increased savings (Simonsen, 1970).
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Following this logic, maintaining or increasing the Brazilian
economy’s capacity for savings was associated with the battle
against inﬂation. Inﬂation had two main causes: (1) government
spending, which was higher than the withdrawal of purchas-
ing power of the private sector in the form of taxes on public
loans; and (2) the disjuncture between the tendency to consume,
resulting from the wage policy, and the tendency to invest, asso-
ciated with the policy of expanding credit for companies. These
inﬂationary pressures were compounded by monetary expansions
(Lara-Resende, 1989). In light of this diagnosis of the causes of
Brazilian inﬂation, anti-inﬂationary policy was based on three
pillars: (1) containing government deﬁcits of non-priority expen-
diture and rationalising the tax system; (2) limiting the rise in real
wages to increases in productivity and acceleration of develop-
ment; and (3) controlling credit policy to prevent the excesses of
cost-push inﬂation and, at the same time, being realistic in order to
adapt to it.
Another diagnosis of Brazil’s economy offered by the PAEG
was institutional strangulation, i.e. the presence of an institutional
framework unfavourable to economic development, as revealed by
the lowreal returnof long-termﬁnancial assets (whichdiscouraged
public and private investment ﬁnancing); the ﬁnancial system’s
weakness; disorganised taxation; the propensity to public deﬁcits;
and employment legislation that discouraged job creation.
In order to overcome these barriers to development, three areas
of institutional disarray –ﬁnance, taxation and the external sector –
were identiﬁed as needing reform as a prerequisite for both stabili-
sation and economic growth. In terms of monetary institutions, the
ﬁnancial reform implemented by the PAEG stands out. Its objective
was to create mechanisms of long-term ﬁnancing which avoided
the inﬂationary ﬁnancing of the public sector, and to allow the
private sector to take back industrial investment so as to improve
economic growth. These objectives led to the adoption of impor-
tant measures such as the creation of index linking, under which
public debt was issued in National Treasury Re-adjustable Bonds
(Obrigac¸ões Reajustáveis do Tesouro Nacional – ORNT) and private
securities came under the capital markets law. This guaranteed
a real positive rate of return, protecting savers against inﬂation
and encouraging saving. Compulsory savingmechanismswere also
developed, and investment and ﬁnancial banks, the Central Bank
of Brazil (BCB) and the National Monetary Council (Conselho Mon-
etário Nacional – CMN) were all created.
These measures restructured the national ﬁnancial system and
led to a resurgence in the market for public bonds. However, it
introduced problems that later would lead to a great impasse in
attempts to control the country’s inﬂation, namely the index link-
ingwhich adapted the economic system to high inﬂation and led to
past inﬂationbeingprojected into the future. Thishad theeffect that
Brazil’s status as an inﬂationary economy was acknowledged and
tacitly accepted, allowing inﬂation-linking rules to be introduced
and leading Brazilians to coexist peacefully with inﬂation. This
index linking permeated all reforms, with the introduction of rules
for exchange rate and salary corrections, ﬁnancial asset protection
and tax system adjustment.
As a result, both the structuring of the ﬁnancial system, with
the introduction of index linking and the formation of a market
for public bonds, and the strategy of ﬁnancing via indebtedness
adopted by the state resulted in conditions that allowed inﬂation
to take a seemingly automatic trajectory. In otherwords, thatwhich
seemed to give life to the economic system by allowing ‘peaceful’
co-existence with inﬂation in fact gave rise to a process that ended
up immobilising it.
The formation of a new Brazilian tax system in the mid-sixties
also followedhistoric steps to change thecurrencyandcredit. Based
on research carried out by a technical commission formed before
the 1964 coup, the new military government imposed approval of
a new and genuinely revolutionary tax system in 1965. Brazil was
a pioneer in introducing value added tax (VAT); indeed, it was the
ﬁrst continent-sized and federally-organised country to adopt this
tax on a national scale. However, Brazil todayﬁnds itself still paying
for its original sin, while no other country has ever applied VAT in
the same way. Brazilian VAT is determined under a physical credit
system (to date Brazil ignores universal ﬁnancial credit), restricted
to the circulation of goods (initially it was not imposed on fuel and
electricity) and, most seriously, delegated to state level. Another
form of VAT, limited to industrialised products, was implemented
at the same time at federal level: the Tax on Industrialized Products
(Imposto sobre Produto Industrializado – IPI).
The new system also consolidated income tax following the
more modern standards of the rest of the world, and created a
system of vertical distribution of tax receipts in favour of regional
governments, which was logical and straightforward. Based on
indirect taxes, the system quickly responded well to the so-called
economic miracle (based on increased consumption of durables)
between the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s. During this
period, crucially, the tax burden grew in phaseswhen the economic
cycle was expanding. Federal centralisation was also efﬁcient, at
least in trying to direct regional expenditure and encourage invest-
ment, particularly in economic infrastructure.
After the mid-1970s oil crisis, the economy and tax burden
stagnated and the government tried to compensate for losses by
other federal bodies by encouraging borrowing, including from
abroad. As ﬁscal functionality fell, political pressure mounted for
gradual decentralisation; state governors became directly elected
again, while the President of the Republic continued to be cho-
sen indirectly. In this context, a huge and growing tax system
reform movement was less concerned with changing taxes than
with decentralising income, whether by increasing those collected
directly by regional governments (which interested the govern-
ments of the wealthiest regions the most), or by redeeming and
raising the percentage of federal funds intended for participation
funds (which was favoured by governments of the poorer regions).
A similar process of reform also took place in public adminis-
tration itself, including self-imposed reforms and bold changes:
devolution (withmanymunicipalities, foundations and funds), and
decentralisation (with the two aforementioned spheres of regional
governments).
Although inﬂation was relatively high in the period before
the 1970s, it was largely kept under control thanks to gradual-
ist inﬂation-control measures such as ﬁscal austerity, monetary,
credit and salary contraction, and realignment of monitored prices.
The oil shocks of the 1970s (1973 and 1979) inaugurated a fresh
outbreak of inﬂation in Brazil, with growing indexing mecha-
nisms allowing the Brazilian population to live with increasingly
high rates of inﬂation. A wide variety of assets were indexed,
including savings accounts, public debt, rental contracts and, from
1979, wages contracts as well. This indexing process reduced
the uncertainties of agents with regards to the future economic
environment, and lessened the pressures on internal interest
rates.
Inﬂation began to accelerate more sharply from the beginning
of the 1980s. The decade was marked by the threat of an exchange
rate crisis due to the secondoil shock, the rise in international inter-
est rates and the greater difﬁculty of obtaining outside resources.
Given these conditions, Brazil was forced to seek external adjust-
ment through a standard internal demand-control policy. Fig. 1
shows the monthly inﬂation rates from the end of 1970s to the
mid-1990s.
A combination of factors – including internal recession, a drop in
realwages, exchange rate devaluation, drops in oil prices and inter-
est rates, and the recovery of theUnited States economy–helped to
meet external account targets in 1983 (Carneiro & Modiano, 1989).
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Fig. 1. Inﬂation in Brazil – monthly change of IPCA – 1979–1995.
Source: IBGE (2015).
In this respect, the external adjustment of the Brazilian economy
between 1981 and 1984 was highly successful in generating large
commercial surpluses and rebalancing the balance of payments.
However, the internal imbalances and, notably, the high inﬂation
rateswere treatedwith excessive tolerance and/or passive compla-
cency.
In short, the external crisis of the 1980s compromised the
standard of ﬁnancing that had been maintained in the Brazilian
economy since the reforms of 1964, and unleashed the process
of accelerated inﬂation. The collapse of external ﬁnancing made it
necessary to establish trade surpluses, making the need for public
sectorﬁnancingevengreater inorder to cover external liabilities. At
that time, very particular relationships were established between
exchange rate, ﬁscal and monetary policies. This was because the
need to ﬁnance the balance of payments led to policies of exchange
rate devaluations, which in turn extended the ﬁnancial burdens of
liabilities designated in dollars, leading to an escalation of the ﬁscal
crisis. This situation also imposed limits on the control of mone-
tary policy, since without obtaining the resources required in the
payment of the external liabilities, the public sector depended on
the placement of bonds and the growth of the monetary base. In
turn, placing the personal property debt depended on the reliabil-
ity and liquidity of public bonds, andalsoon thevalueof the interest
required in appreciation of private capital (Lopreato, 2002).
Under these conditions, inﬂationwas taken not only at the value
of the public deﬁcit, but also on the conditions of ﬁxed exchange
and interest rates, which limited other prices in the economy and
imposed an inﬂation ceiling. That being the case, breaking the link
between ﬁscal, monetary and exchange rate policies depended on
abandoning the active exchange rate and interest policies, which
would only be made possible by means of alternative conditions to
enable the ﬁnancing of the balance of payments and the restruc-
turing of external public liabilities.
In view of these circumstances, and the deep economic crisis
that the country experienced throughout the period, the 1980s
are often considered to be a ‘lost decade’ for the Brazilian econ-
omy. GDP stagnated or fell (1981: −4.3%; 1982: 0.8% and 1983:
−2.9%). Inﬂation, even amidst an output slump, had already accel-
erated signiﬁcantly, reaching 100% per year in 1980, and rising
further following the sharp exchange rate devaluation of 1983. It
reached 224% per year in 1984 (following the General Price Index
ou Índíce Geral de Prec¸os – IGP). By this point, it had become clear
that the Brazilian economy’s most salient problem was inﬂation,
and it is in this context that debates about the causes of Brazilian
inﬂation arose among economists (Arida, 1982, 1986; Arida & Lara-
Resende, 1985a, 1985b; Bresser-Pereira, 1981; Bresser-Pereira &
Nakano, 1984a, 1984b; Lara-Resende, 1980, 1985; Lopes, 1976,
1986; Modiano, 1983; Rangel, 1974; Simonsen, 1970).
Having witnessed the ineffectiveness of the ﬁscal and monetary
measures adopted to curb inﬂation – even when restrictive ﬁscal
and monetary policies were implemented, inﬂation continued to
accelerate – the theory that indexing the economy was an essential
part of the problem of Brazilian inﬂation was gaining ground. This
“inertial inﬂation” was a powerful mechanism for automatic retro-
alignmentof price increases in theeconomy, inasmuchas it enabled
agents to incorporate past inﬂation into new contracts. This grew
from inﬂation’s inertial nature itself, as, in an indexed economy,
the inﬂationary trend was based on the previous period’s inﬂation,
which was made worse by ﬂuctuations from supply or demand
shocks that were incorporated into the inﬂationary trend (Lopes,
1986). As seen in Fig. 1, the secondhalf of the1980s and theﬁrst half
of the 1990s were marked by failed attempts to combat inﬂation:
the Cruzado Plan in 1986, Bresser Plan in 1987, Verão Plan in 1989
and Collor Plan in 1990.
Indeed, this period was characterised by grand experiments
and theories regarding how to control inﬂation. These, along with
their ﬂaws, provided lessons which assisted in drafting the Real
Plan, a landmark that ended the almost decade-long cycle of failed
attempts to combat inﬂation in Brazil. It is worth noting that the
1980s also represented the decline of a growth model that had
been in place in the Brazilian economy for almost 50 years, some-
times called the Import Substitution PlanoPlano de Substituic¸ão de
Importac¸ões – PSI), based on a commitment to state-led growth.1
This growthmodel had led to the “ﬁnal stage” of industrialisation in
Brazil, encompassingall sectorsof industry in thecountry (although
there was no internalisation of technical progress or development
of an industry able to face international competition). The crisis
1 Castro (2011, p. 133) summarises the main features of the Import Substitution
Model adopted in Brazil: (1) direct involvement by the state in providing economic
infrastructure and in priority sectors; (2) high protection to national industry by
means of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and (3) the supply of credit by the state
for new investment projects. In addition to this, the author highlights three key
roles of the state in this model: that of stimulating industrialisation by means of
credit concession, exchange rate policy, tariff and non-tariff measures; that of the
employer, aimed at removing the strangulation points of the economy; and that of
the manager of scant exchange resources, preventing exchange rate crises resulting
from a higher demand for foreign currency.
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of the 1980s, therefore, was not merely economic; it represented,
in the form of the state ﬁscal-ﬁnancial catastrophe, a crisis for the
whole paradigm of development in place up to that moment.
3. The Real Plan and its main institutions
It is against this background of a changed model of economic
development that aprogrammeof structural reformwasadopted in
Brazil in the 1990s, comprising government reform, new trade and
ﬁnancial policy with a clear liberalising inclination, downsizing of
the state apparatus, tax reformand aprivatisationprogrammewith
extensive involvement from theﬁnancial system. This amounted to
a process of structural change in the Brazilian economy, based on
twomain aspects in particular: reformof the state, and commercial
and ﬁnancial liberalisation.
With regard to the ﬁrst aspect, the development model adopted
by Brazil in the 1990s comprised major institutional changes
amounting to a readjustment of the role of the state in the econ-
omy, which became very different from the role of the state during
the ISI era. In the new model, the guarantee of government credi-
bility became a requirement of the internationalmarket, since in an
environment characterised by free movement of capital between
countries, ﬁscal austerity policies become major indications of
an economy’s payment capacity. Meanwhile, the second aspect
of structural change – the sweeping liberalisation that saw the
opening up of the economy commercially and ﬁnancially – served,
together with privatisation, to guarantee the Brazilian government
a supply of liquidity. This, along with the return of liquidity in
the international arena, made abandoning exchange rate devalu-
ation viable as economic policy, and was the essence of the price
stabilisation policy in Brazil (as will be discussed later on).
This sets the scene for the Real Plan, a price stabilisation strategy
implemented in Brazil in three distinct phases between May 1993
and January 1999. These phases can be summarised as follows: (1)
short-term ﬁscal adjustment; (2) the de-indexing of the economy,
and (3) the introduction of an exchange rate anchor (Modenesi,
2005).
In the ﬁrst phase, involving endorsing ﬁscal adjustment, the
objectivewas to equalise budget imbalances in Brazil in the coming
years, and thereby forestall inﬂationary pressures. The adjustment
had threemain features: reducing expenditure, increasing revenue,
and reducing federal government transfers. The ﬁrst and second
features were included in the Immediate Action Programme (Pro-
grama de Ac¸ão Imediata, PAI), launched in May 1992, with the aim
of reducing public spending, increasing tax-collection, combating
tax evasion, redeﬁning relations between Federal, States and the
Municipal Governments, and strengthening the process of decen-
tralisation. The third featurewas based on the approval in February
1994 of the Emergency Social Fund (Fundo Social de Emergência
– FSE), which was to be funded by 15% of all taxes collected in
order that the federal government would not need to infringe the
spending obligations established by the constitution of 1988. The
importance of this fund – the reason for the label ‘emergency’ – lay
in the fact that there were insufﬁcient resources to ﬁnance social
spending, meaning a risk of inﬂationary ﬁnancing.
Authors making the case for ﬁscal adjustment tended to argue
that inﬂation caused erosion of the budget and masked the public
deﬁcit (Bacha, 1994). With revenue indexed but expenditure not
there was a erosion of government expenditure. Along with the
management of the National Treasury, which sped up the release
of budgetary items and corroded the real value of expenditure, this
led to a reverse Tanzi effect in Brazil. This was because the increase
in inﬂation, rather than reducing government income, reduced
its real expenditure and its deﬁcit, meaning that the interrup-
tion of the inﬂationary process would lead to ﬁscal deterioration,
therefore making ﬁscal adjustment a precondition for price
stabilisation.
However, other authors argued that the link between public
deﬁcit and inﬂation could be refuted empirically as the good results
of public accounts from 1990 to 1993 (which displayed a pri-
mary surplus in every year) did not inhibit inﬂationary acceleration
(Lopreato, 2002). Furthermore, the ﬁscal adjustment proposed by
the Real Plan was not effective, with primary results of 0.24% of
GNP in 1995; 0.9% in 1996; −0.88 in 1997 and 0.01% in 1998. How-
ever, the absence of this adjustment did not stop a fall in inﬂation
in this period. The fact that the public deﬁcit was not at the root
of the inﬂationary process does not mean to say that the Brazilian
ﬁscal situation was not problematic, or even that outside investors’
lowered expectationswere not partly a result of this (Castro, 2011).
The second stage of the Real Plan sought to eliminate inﬂation-
ary inertia and align the economy’s relative prices. As discussed in
the previous section, the indexing system on the one hand eased
the effects of inﬂation on the economy, making it possible for eco-
nomic agents to coexist for a long time with high inﬂation rates
in Brazil, but on the other hand made it more difﬁcult to stop
inﬂation, because of the great weight of its inertial nature. Stop-
ping inﬂation therefore became a ﬁght against inertial inﬂation,
which had to be prevented as a precondition for monetary policy
to be effective again. A further preoccupation in the second stage
of the Plan was the realignment of prices. A wide array of rela-
tive prices existed as a result of differences in the periods when
they were readjusted. This meant that in the event of a sudden
drop in inﬂation, problems would arise linked to the distribution
conﬂict involved in the transfer of income from agents whose con-
tracts were phased out to agents whose contracts were readjusted.
Stopping the process of inﬂation therefore needed to happen in
a neutral way, with alignment of all prices and incomes on the
same date and by means of an indexer which would be the same
for all.
The Real Value Unit (Unidade Real de Valor – URV) was set up in
March 1994 in order to align relative prices and co-ordinate inﬂa-
tionary expectations. It consisted of an account unit indexed by the
average of three inﬂation indexes.2 In addition to this, the mar-
ket – in order to increase its credibility in relation to the URV –
went on to have one-to-one parity with the dollar. The URV was
launched on 1st March, 1994 against the backdrop of all these fac-
tors, and remained in place until 30th June of the same year, when
it was jettisoned in order to convert to the new currency – the Real
– on 1st July. On that date, as summarised by Modenesi (2005),
the redenomination of the monetary stock, the changing of all the
currency in circulation in the country and the conversion of con-
tracts still drawn in terms of cruzeiros reais were made at a rate of
1 Real = 2750.00 Cruzeiros Reais, which was the URV value at 30th
June, 1994.
At the same time as the URV was created, the Central Bank
of Brazil took action on the exchange market, selling all dollars
at the URV/dollar parity of one-to-one, creating an asymmetrical
exchange band in Brazil with a ceiling of 1. In order to do this,
the Central Bank held US$ 40 billion in international reserves. It is
important to stress that the exchange rate was not ﬁxed, but both
the National Monetary Council and the Central Bank had very strict
instructions regarding the need to maintain the exchange rate’s
upper limit.
2 Such indexes were: (i) the General Market Price Index (Índice Geral de Prec¸os
deMercado - IGP-M) of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV); (ii) the Extensive Con-
sumer Price Index (ÍNdice de Prec¸os ao Consumidor Amplo – ICPA) of the Brazilian
Geography and Statistics Institute (IBGE); and (iii) the Consumer Price Index (Índice
de Prec¸os ao Consumidor – IPC) fromEconomic Research Institute Foundation (FIPE)
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Table 1
Selected indicators in the period 1994–98.
Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Growth of GNP (% p.a.) 5.3 4.4 2.2 3.4 0.0
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% GNP) 20.7 18.3 16.9 17.4 17.0
Inﬂation (% p.a.) 2075.827 66,008 15.757 6.926 3.196
Current Account Balance −0.308 −2.388 −2.734 −3.477 −3.944
International reserves (US$ millions) 38,806 51,840 60,110 52,173 44,546
Interest rate – 53.09 27.41 24.78 28.79
Real exchange rate/dollar 0.64 0.92 1.01 1.08 1.16
Primary surplus 5.2 0.2 −0.1 0.9 0.0
Liquid public sector debt (% GNP) 30.0 28.0 30.7 31.8 38.9
Source: IPEADATA (2014), IMF (2014) and BCB (2014).
The third phase of the Real Plan encompassed the period July
1994 to January 1999. It saw ﬁrstly the adoption of a system of
monetary targets and later the replacement of this with a system
of exchange rate targets.
As the new currency began to circulate, Brazil chose to adopt
a system of monetary targets comprising the following measures:
(1) adopting targets for the monetary base, which could only be
changed by 20% and by the CMN; (2) weighting the monetary base
in international reserves; (3) setting up a ﬁxed parity between the
Real and the US dollar, and (4) changing the CMN with regards to
its composition and the transfer of its authority to issue currency
to the national congress.
However, this newpolicy did not have the expected results. This
was because for the system of monetary targets to be successful
the currency had to be circulating at a stable speed, but with the
inﬂationary process interrupted the Brazilian currency recovered
its traditional functions of value reserve, means of exchange and
account unit, which led to an increase in demand for Real stock.
This involved severing the relationship between monetary stocks
and price levels, creating difﬁculties for the Central Bank when it
came to determining the amount of currency supply compatible
with price stability, and caused the system of monetary targets to
fail in Brazil.
With the system of monetary targets abandoned, the system
of exchange rate targets took its place – a system which could be
said to constitute the essence of the process of price stabilisation in
Brazil. The use of exchange as an anchor for monetary policy was
possible due to the economic liberalisation entailed in the struc-
tural reforms of the 1990s and the measures used to overvalue
the exchange rate. This set of policies meant that Brazilian imports
were relatively cheaper than domestic production, which meant
an increase in external competition and collective demand shifting
in favour of imported products. This in turn exerted less pressure
on internal prices and restricted the domestic production sector’s
ability to shape prices and co-ordinate inﬂationary expectations.
The revalued exchange rate policy altered the framework
(mentioned above) of relationships between exchange, ﬁscal and
monetary policies in place during the previous period. This pol-
icy made it possible to reduce uncertainty over the behaviour of
basic prices in the economy, as economic agents could now form
expectations based on a predictable exchange rate. Besides the
exchange anchor, monetary and ﬁscal policies were also used to
reduce exchange rate uncertainties. Guarantees had to be offered to
attract capital to ﬁnance possible balance of payments imbalances,
which would in turn ensure that there were no unmet expecta-
tions for capital investors which could result in capital ﬂight and
problems in the price stability strategy being adopted. As well as
high interest rates, the reforms of the 1990s – i.e. privatisation and
trade and ﬁnancial liberalisation – helped to attract outside capital
to Brazil (Lopreato, 2002).
Most of this capitalwas seeking a return frompublic bonds,with
interest rates set to meet foreign economic agents’ expectations,
and guaranteed by the Brazilian government. This meant that pub-
lic ﬁnance had to accommodate the costs of the exchange and
interest policies andprevent situations that could risk capital ﬂight.
With regard to monetary policy, high interest rates throughout
the period 1994–8 served as another anchor on prices, and at
some points were more important than the exchange anchor itself,
which, by virtue of its changed nature by the end of that period,
lost its capacity to act as a price anchor (Castro, 2011). As such, the
system of exchange rate targets was highly successful in revers-
ing the process of severe and chronic inﬂation that had devastated
the Brazilian economy. However, after going through the ﬁnancial
turbulence caused by the Mexican crisis in 1995, the Asian crisis
in 1997, and the Russian crisis in 1998, Brazil abandoned its ﬁxed
exchange rate system due to speculative attacks that reduced for-
eign reserves. The system of exchange rate targets was replaced
by the system of inﬂation targets, marking the beginning of a new
phase in the stabilisation process in Brazil, and the end of the Real
Plan (Modenesi, 2005).
To summarise the outcome of this period, then, it is notable that
themacroeconomic systemat the time, characterisedbyhigh inter-
est rates, an overvalued currency and a rising trend in public debt,
was efﬁcient in controlling prices, despite the adverse effects on
the real economy in terms of reduced economic growth, deﬁcit in
the balance of payments and growth of public debt.
To illustrate macroeconomic behaviour during the Real Plan
years, Table 1 (below) traces selected indicators for the period
1994–98.
As these indicators suggest, the Real Plan was a highly success-
ful experiment in stabilisation for the Brazilian economy. In the
period following 1994 inﬂation fell signiﬁcantly and stayed at this
level.
However, this price stability was achieved through relatively
high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate. With regard
to the interest rate, while high level rates served to attract outside
capital and to ﬁnance the balance of payments – helping with the
strategy of sustaining high exchange rates – they also increased the
proportion of public debt indexed to them, causing this variable’s
trajectory to increase at the same time. The overvalued exchange
rate, meanwhile, brought problems for the balance of payments in
current account transactions, as demonstrated by successive grow-
ing deﬁcits, which also contributed to the declining trend of foreign
reserves from 1996.
One further result of the price stability policy was weak eco-
nomic growth. During the 1990s, the performance of GDP was
somewhat irregular; in the early years of the decade – a period of
high inﬂation – GDP showed negative growth (4.3% in 1990; 1.0%
in 1991 and −0.5% in 1992), increasing again with the introduc-
tion of the Real Plan and after the currency stabilised. The return of
growth, however, was only at decreased rates, reﬂecting the difﬁ-
culties of resuming investment on poorly maintained bases. As the
next sectionwillmention, itwas only from themid-2000s that GDP
grew more signiﬁcantly.
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4. Institutional reform and monetary policy
The Brazilian exchange rate crisis in January 1999 resulted in a
major devaluation of the Real against the US dollar, seeing it fall
from a rate of 1.20 in December 1998 to 1.98 in January 1999.
Initially, the policy adopted by the Brazilian government was to
suddenly increase the basic interest rate in an attempt to counter
the fall in the exchange rate and avoid a return to inﬂation. After
the stabilisation of the exchange rate in the middle of 1999, the
government announced that it would adopt an inﬂation target sys-
tem. Opting for a ﬂoating exchange rate system meant that the
exchange rate had to be replaced as the anchor of monetary policy
and another variable adopted instead to coordinate market expec-
tations and control inﬂation in this new context (Barbosa Filho,
2006).
This period was marked by a three-fold change in the macro-
economic system in force up until then: the monetary system of
exchange rate targets was replaced by an inﬂation target system,
the system of semi-ﬁxed exchange rates gave way to a managed
ﬂoating exchange rate, and the ﬁscal system began to pursue pri-
mary surplus targets. This change became known as the Brazilian
macroeconomic tripod. Each aspect is discussed in turn below.
Firstly, the system of inﬂation targets adopted in 1999 in Brazil
can be summarised as follows: (1) inﬂation targets are represented
by annual changes in a general price index; (2) targets and their
respective tolerance intervals are ﬁxed by the CMN based on a pro-
posal from the Ministry of Finance; (3) targets and their related
tolerance intervals are ﬁxed for two years; (4) the Central Bank of
Brazil is responsible for carrying out the policies necessary to meet
these targets; (5) a target is considered to have been met when the
accumulated variation of inﬂation, measured by the price index
adopted for the January to December period of each calendar year,
is within its respective tolerance interval; (6) when a target is not
met, the Chairman of the Central Bank must publish, by means of
an open letter to the Minister of Finance, a detailed description of
the causes of the failure, the steps to ensure that inﬂation returns
to the set levels, and the period in which the steps are expected to
produce results; (7) the Central Bank of Brazil must publish, by the
last day of each calendar quarter, an inﬂation report covering the
performance of the inﬂation targets systems, the outcomes ofmon-
etary policy decisions taken, and an inﬂation forecast (Bogdansky,
Tombini, & Werlang, 2000).
Table 2 shows the history of inﬂation targets in Brazil, showing
the exact target, the tolerance interval for inﬂation ﬂuctuation, and
the real rate of inﬂation asmeasured by the IPCA. The instrument of
monetarypolicy chosenby theMonetaryPolicyCommittee (Comitê
de Política Monetária – COPOM) to meet inﬂation targets was the
short-term interest rate known as the SELIC rate. SELIC is the rate
used as a benchmark for interest in the Brazilian economy; it sets
the boundaries of the reserve exchanges between ﬁnancial institu-
tions and is consideredby themarket to be themain indicator of the
government’s monetary policy. This rate safeguards all the issued
bonds of the Central Bank of Brazil, the National Treasury, and var-
ious states and municipalities, as well as inter-ﬁnancial deposits
heldbymanybankswith a commercial portfolio, commercial banks
and savings banks.
Under the system of inﬂation targets, inﬂation is fundamentally
controlled by ﬁxing the basic interest rate at a level that is compat-
ible with the inﬂationary target set by the CMN. Copom is made up
of the management of the Central Bank and meets every 45 days to
set the interest rate it considers appropriate in order to meet the
inﬂation target.
An important feature of the Inﬂation Target system is its high
level of transparency; besides the Inﬂation Reports, the min-
utes of Copom meetings are also published, as well as press
releases and different studies on the management and direction of
monetary policy in Brazil. The aim of these mechanisms is to give
credibility to the monetary authority’s actions and interventions in
the country’s economy. When adopting the inﬂation targets sys-
tem, the CMN decided to use the Extensive Consumer Price Index
(IPCA) as a benchmark for monetary policy.3 It is noteworthy that
Brazil uses the “full” index of the IPCA unlike other countries,
which use either a purged index of prices with a high sensitivity
to supply shocks such as in food and energy, or prices ﬁxed by the
government.
Under this new framework, othermacroeconomic policieswere
subordinate to price control via monetary policy, responding pas-
sively to its decisions. Thus, the interest rate (SELIC) became the
main instrument used by the monetary authority to ensure that
the IPCA will remain in the ﬂuctuation band established by the
CMN, as stated by the BCB itself: “The interest rate constitutes
the most important monetary policy instrument available to the
Central Bank”(Inﬂation Report, v 1, No 1, June 1999, p.87). In
this sense understanding the transmission mechanisms of mon-
etary policy is critical because they represent the channels through
whichmonetary policy decisions takenby the Central Bank become
incentives for desired behaviour of private agents. The effective-
ness of monetary policy depends directly on the way in which the
monetary authority decisions impact, after all, on consumers and
investors.4
Moving on to the performance of the Brazilian economy under
the inﬂation target system, it is notable that the Central Bank of
Brazil has met the inﬂation targets put forward (except for in 2001,
2002and2003), indicating that the systemcanbeconsideredhighly
successful in controlling price levels. The fact that the country had
experienced a long period of chronic high inﬂation contributes to
this outcome being seen as a major success for the Brazilian econ-
omy, although the associated costs of this price stabilisation policy
must also be assessed.
In the period 1999–2013 inﬂation was outside the set tolerance
interval for only four years, namely 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2015. In
the former three years, several external anddomestic shocks – such
as the energy crisis, the effects of the 11th September 2001 terror-
ist attacks, the Argentinian crisis, and the crisis of conﬁdence in
relation to the presidential elections in 2002 – affected the Brazil-
ian economy, with a signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation. The mandatory
open letters of the Chairman of the BCB during these years point
to exchange rate devaluation as the main reason the targets were
not met. In 2001, 38% of the increase in the inﬂation rate was
explained by currency devaluation, while in 2002 the exchange
rate’s contribution to inﬂation was 46%. The high inﬂation of 2003
was explained by inﬂationary inertia, resulting from the pressure
on prices occurring in the previous year.
For the year 2014, the acceleration of the consumer price index
showed essentially the realignment of regulated prices and the
increase in services prices. It is noteworthy that the federal gov-
ernment had controlled the fuel and energy prices to avoid the
impact on general inﬂation indices. Therefore, in 2015, inﬂation
moved away from the inﬂation target because of the cost inﬂation,
3 Every month the IPCA selects the prices from a basket of goods and services
identiﬁed in the Family Budget Research Study (POF), taking as its target population
families whose monthly earnings are equivalent to between 1 and 40 minimum
wages, living in the urban areas of Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, BeloHorizonte,
Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre, Brasília and Goiânia.
4 There are basically ﬁve channels through which monetary policy can affect the
change in the general price level: (i) the term structure of interest rates; (Ii) the
exchange rate; (Iii) expectations; (iv) the credit; and (v) the price of the assets.
Therefore, variations in the Selic rate affect the ﬁve variablesmentioned, inﬂuencing
investment decisions, consumption and net exports, which in turn affect aggregate
demand and, ﬁnally, the general price level.
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Table 2
History of Inﬂation Targets in Brazil (1999–2013).
Year Regulation Goal (%) Band (p.p.) Lower and Upper
Limits (%)
Effective Inﬂation
(IPCA % p.a.)
1999 Decision 2615 8 2 6–10 8.94
2000 Decision 2615 6 2 4–8 5.97
2001 Decision 2615 4 2 2–6 7.67
2002 Decision 2744 3.5 2 1.5–5.5 12.53
2003a Decision 2842
Decision 2972
3.25
4
2
2.5
1.25–5.25
1.5–6.5
9.30
2004a Decision 2842
Decision 3108
3.75
5.5
2.5
2..5
1.25–6.25
3–8
7.60
2005 Decision 3108 4.5 2.5 2–7 5.69
2006 Decision 3210 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 3.14
2007 Decision 3291 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 4.46
2008 Decision 3378 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 5.90
2009 Decision 3463 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 4.31
2010 Decision 3584 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 5.91
2011 Decision 3748 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 6.50
2012 Decision 3880 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 5.84
2013 Decision 3991 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 5.91
2014 Decision 4095 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 6.41
2015 Decision 4237 4.5 2 2.5–6.5 10.67
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
a The Open Letter of 21/1/2003 set out adjusted goals of 8.5% for 2003 and 5.5% for 2004.
as a result of the increase in electricity tariffs and fuel prices and
the rise in the price of the dollar against the real.
In all the other years the inﬂation targetsweremet, and the high
interest rates were the instrument used to meet them. Meanwhile,
currency appreciation was not simply an unwanted by-product of
the monetary policy, but rather the essence of that price-control
strategy, as became clear in the years when the inﬂation targets
were not met.5 Among the consequences of the price control pol-
icy, it is notable that high interest rates were pointed to as one
of the main reasons for low Brazilian GDP growth, speciﬁcally in
comparison with other emerging countries. Real production grew
byaround2.77%,while inChina and India it grewat 9.42%and7.13%
per year between 1999 and 2015.
The exchange rate also showeda rising trend, because thediffer-
ential between domestic and foreign interest rates contributed to a
substantial inﬂowof foreign capital anda consequent rise inBrazil’s
currency. Despite the beneﬁts for price control, this revaluation
5 For a more detailed analysis of the inﬂation targeting regime performance,
it is interesting to decompose Brazilian inﬂation in its various components. The
decomposition by the Central Bank of Brazil (BC) divides the IPCA in market prices
composed of tradable and non-tradable goods and regulated prices. Tradables are
strongly inﬂuenced by the external sector and the exchange rate, since the non-
tradable are oriented and produced for domestic market, an important example is
the services sectors. Regulated prices are directly related to public administration,
for example, tariffs, fuel prices and energy. The regulated prices exert strong inﬂu-
ence from 1999 to 2006, but since then the biggest inﬂuence was of market prices,
speciﬁcally the non-tradable. Besides the division of the Central Bank, the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) also divide IPCA in 9 groups: Food and
Beverages,Housing,Household items, Clothing, Transportation,Health andPersonal
Care, Personal Expenses, Education and Communication. A guide for the weights
of each group is the Household Budget Survey (POF), which measures the typical
household consumption of the populationwith incomeup to fortyminimumwages.
The communication groups, Food& Beverage, Housing and Transportation are those
who remain in highest level for the ﬁrst half of the reporting period (1999–2006).
In the second, the main responsible for inﬂation are Food & Beverage, Personal
Expenses and Clothing (2007–2013). The adjustments of the ﬁrst half of the period
occurred mainly because of rising fuel prices, the adjustment of public tariffs and
the higher price of agricultural products. In 2007, when the trend reversed, that
is, when market prices began to inﬂuence more inﬂation than regulated prices, the
group that strongly inﬂuenced the IPCAwas Foods andBeverages, like industrial and
agricultural prices, highlighting the presence of unfavorable seasonal factors to agri-
cultural products and also to the service sector, mismatching supply and demand.
Also noteworthy in this period, the increase in prices of services associated with the
exchange rate depreciation, in addition to Personal Expenses and Education.
discouraged exports and encouraged imports, implying current
account deﬁcits. This helped limit growth and made ﬁnancing the
balance of payments reliant on attracting short-term, speculative
capital.
In relation to thepublic accounts, despite the successive positive
primary outcomes, net borrowing grew due to interest costs. The
return on Letra Financeira do Tesouro Nacional (LFTs was linked
to SELIC, at high levels. To explain Brazil’s high interest rate, some
authors like Modenesi and Modenesi (2012) point to the reduced
efﬁciencyofmonetarypolicy, themultiple changes to interest rates,
the fragility of the public accounts and jurisdictional uncertainty.
Another possible explanation, presented in Barbosa-Filho (2006) is
the lack of independence of the central bank which, in order to be
credible, needs to offer high returns to investors; however, there
is a theoretical weakness behind this thesis, as it can compromise
coordination between ﬁscal and monetary policies.
In the regimeof inﬂation targeting, adoptedbyBrazil since1999,
the Brazilian interest rate (SELIC) is the main instrument used by
theCentral Bank to control inﬂation. Thus theprices control is based
on increases in this rate, which through the transmission channels
of monetary policy affect aggregate demand, international prices
and thus inﬂation. Therefore, this scheme follows the hypothesis
that inﬂation is typically a demand phenomenon, which must be
combated by the use of contractive monetary policy, in particu-
lar, increases in the interest rate. Thus, the system neglects other
causes of inﬂation, especially those related to the supply side of the
economy such as wage and proﬁt push inﬂation; imported price-
hike inﬂation; inﬂation arising from supply shocks; tax inﬂation
and the existence of some degree of inertia in the inﬂation rate.
However, the Brazilian experience of price control under the inﬂa-
tion targeting regime shows that inﬂation does not always derive
fromdemand shocks, so that the use of interest rates, inmost cases,
does not attack the real cause inﬂation, but only its symptoms.
In addition, the rise in interest rates to contain prices increases
in the economy may result in harmful effects, such as income stag-
nation, increasing public deﬁcit, appreciation of the exchange rate
and increase in employment gap, causing the economy to remain
in a permanent state of stop and go (Sicsú, 2002).
Such ﬁndings suggest the key elements of policy recommenda-
tions based on the Brazilian experience in inﬂation targeting. The
ﬁrst is that the price control should not be solely based on inter-
est rate increases and the second is that an institutional system
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ensuring a degree of ﬂexibility to the model can lead to better
results in terms of economic growth.
As regards the ﬁrst recommendation, that is, the need for alter-
native policies to control inﬂation, we can use the decomposition
of Brazilian inﬂation and its different determinants to highlight
that one of the main factors that contributed to prices increas-
ing in Brazil during the inﬂation targeting regime was the change
in the exchange rate. In this connection, Oreiro, Paula, and Squeff
(2009) note that emerging economies are generally more vulnera-
ble to the effects of ﬂuctuations in exchange rates than developed
economies. This is because, according to the authors, the volatility
of the exchange rate is higher in those countries due to the fact
that foreign exchange markets are smaller and less liquid, making
these economies more vulnerable. The same authors also point out
that these changes in exchange rate, most common in this group
of countries, can inﬂuence the exchange rate pass-through and so
the prices of tradable ﬁnal goods and imported intermediate goods,
and also inﬂation expectations.
To mitigate inﬂationary pressures from the external sector, in
addition to changes in interest rates that are the essence of mon-
etary policy in Brazil, Sicsú (2003) argues that industrial policy
to encourage investment in the export sector becomes of prior-
ity. This is because, in replacing imports, the effect of inﬂation
is reduced. Another effective measure would be in the context
of monetary policy, in which the central bank could increase the
reserve requirements on bank deposits to contain pressures in the
foreign exchange market. Still concerning policy alternatives to
increase the interest rate to affect the level of the exchange rate
and inﬂation, Oreiro et al. (2009) suggest that capital controls be
used to mitigate the high exchange rate volatility in developing
countries associated with the high mobility of capital ﬂows and its
severe impact on inﬂation and on output and employment in these
economies.
Another importantpoint tonoteabout thedeterminantsof inﬂa-
tion in Brazil between 1999 and 2015 is the existing indexation
mechanisms that guide the price adjustment in various sectors of
the economy. Among these are the following, according Modenesi
and Ferrari-Filho (2011); rents (indexed to the IGP-M), the elec-
tricity rates (partly linked to the IGP-M) and telephony (indexed
to a sector index, IST, also composed of the IGP-M) and the mini-
mum wage (which was indexed to the IPCA and GDP growth). For
the authors, these are key prices in the economy, or widely used
inputs that contribute to enlarge the inertial component of inﬂa-
tion. In this sense, the authors recommend as a policy suggestion
to deal with inﬂationary pressures arising from the inertial com-
ponent of inﬂation, the elimination of these remaining vestiges of
indexation.
Another important group of prices that exerted signiﬁcant inﬂa-
tionary pressures in Brazilian price level in the period considered
were commodities and food prices. Conventional monetary policy
has little or no impact on the control of these prices, and the use
of alternative measures became even more important for achiev-
ing price stability levels. Inﬂation in commodity prices has speciﬁc
characteristics and its control can be achieved through a number
of targeted policies to neutralise the problem. Davidson (1994)
highlights the importance of creating mechanisms for protection
or buffer stocks. This is especially important because these prod-
ucts are the basis for several others and thus can have signiﬁcant
impacts on a range of measures of inﬂation.
In this regard, Modenesi and Ferrari-Filho (2011) argue that the
commodities market is strongly impacted by the process of ﬁnan-
cial globalisation. Thus, the market does not necessarily respond to
the structural elements, or economic fundamentals of the relation-
ship between supply and demand, and its pricing occurs through
highly speculative dynamics. This is because, they argue, commodi-
ties have become true ﬁnancial assets.
Therefore, it is important to adopt policies that inhibit spec-
ulation in commodity markets, contributing to the stability of
the international monetary system and reducing consequently the
exchange rate volatility and inﬂationary pressures as a whole.
Alternatives identiﬁedby the sameauthors include, countercyclical
ﬁscal policy, in order to neutralise or minimise the shocks aris-
ing in food prices, also having an effect of reducing volatility in
these markets, in addition to adopting an agricultural policy that
aimed at the stabilisation in the food prices, regulating stocks for
strategic products in the industry. Oreiro et al. (2009) also high-
light additional instruments such as credit controls and/or income
policies as elements to be adopted in order to optimise the use of
economic policy instruments, minimising the negative effects on
output growth rate.
Concerning broader policy recommendations in the light of
Brazil’s experience with the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime,
three characteristics should be highlighted, namely: (i) the goal
of targeting system; (ii) the choice of the index (i.e. if the goal is
a full index or a core inﬂation index) and (iii) the period for the
convergence of inﬂation to target.
Regarding the purpose of the inﬂation targeting regime it was
observed that some variables such as economic growth and public
debtwere hampered by inﬂation control policy. Thus, a recommen-
dation to other countries considering adopting a systemof inﬂation
targets would be a “double mandate system” whereby Monetary
Authorities must pursue two objectives of monetary policy; that
is: output stabilisation and inﬂation control.
Another feature of the Brazilian inﬂation targeting regime is its
adoption of a full index at the expense of other measures such as
core inﬂation. Core inﬂation measures exclude seasonal factors as
agricultural pressures resulting from climatic problems. The pur-
pose of this measure of inﬂation is to use monetary policy just to
address permanent price pressureswithout raising the interest rate
due to factors that are resolved by seasonal ﬂuctuations or are not
sensitive to changes in interest rates as regulated prices.
Finally, any inﬂation targeting model adopted should be pay
careful attention to the period of convergence of inﬂation to its tar-
get. In Brazil this period is one year. International experience shows
that many countries have increased convergence times, for exam-
ple, a year and a half, two years or without speciﬁc time limits for
the convergence to the target. This measure is important in view
of the lag effects of monetary policy on the economy. According
to estimates by the Central Bank of Brazil, monetary policy takes
between 6 and 9 months to affect the economy. This makes choos-
ing a longer period for the convergence of inﬂation to target very
important.
5. Institutional reform and ﬁscal policy
Brazil’s return to democracy in the mid-eighties led to a new
cycle of institutional reforms. Onemilestone in the political process
was the Constitution of October 1988, which set out a tax reform
aimed at strengthening the revenue raising powers of regional gov-
ernments, particularly those of the less developed regions. At the
same time the reformcurtailed somewhat the revenue raisingpow-
ers of the federal government, setting the scene for subsequent
ﬁscal conﬂict between the central and sub-national government.
Theconﬂictbetweendifferent levelsof government (states,munici-
palities and the federal government) is still present today indebates
on the tax system and possible new reforms.
By the mid-eighties there was a consensus among analysts that
lack of ﬁscal discipline was a striking and permanent feature of the
country both in federal, regional and local governments. In fact, this
was not only a problem for Brazil. For Grossman (1988) this prob-
lem is inherent to the weakness of democratic politics as a process
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for making economic decisions. Pissarides (1980) and Buchanan
(1986) argue that governments pursue expansionary ﬁscal and
monetary policies aiming to achieve popularity ratings that enable
them to perpetuate themselves in power. Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Dorn (1987) suggest the adoption of pre-announced
quantitative targets for the money supply, the public deﬁcits gen-
eration restriction and the impositionof limitations on taxation and
government borrowing. Buchanan (1986) goes further and argues
for the incorporation of these goals in the Constitution itself.
In federative states, such debate acquires new elements, since
the establishment of such rules must respect the autonomy prin-
ciple of each constituent of government (Tavares, Manoel, Afonso,
& Peres, 1999; Ter-Minassian, 1997).6 In this regard, the historical
trend towards ﬁscal indiscipline began to change in themid-1980s,
when a long cycle of in-depth reforms of ﬁscal institutions began,
lasting until the end of the century (Giambiagi, 2008; Jaloretto,
2009).An important institutional innovationwas thecreationof the
Secretary of the National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional
– STN) under the Ministry of Finance in 1986: the starting point of
this shift. The Federal government decided to withdraw all govern-
ment functions that were previously exercised by the Central Bank
and state banks, in particular the Bank of Brazil.7 Another striking
feature of that year was the creation of the single National Trea-
sury account – centralising all accounts, making them available
and depositing them in the central bank itself – and the transfer
of all debt management, which previously was carried out by the
central bank, which went on to operate purely for the purposes
of complying with monetary policy (Silva, Carvalho, & Medeiros,
2009).
The Federal Constitution of 1988 also brought great advances
towards ﬁscal stabilisation, reforming the budget and modernising
the system with three new legal requirements: a multiannual plan,
budgetary guidelines and an annual budget. In the area of ﬁnancial
regulations, it made it constitutional to prohibit the central bank
fromﬁnancing governments, andopened theway for a national law
to later be drawn up on ﬁscal responsibility, which also applied to
regional governments.
The second half of the 1990s saw a number of legal changes
(including through constitutional amendments) which, ﬁrstly, did
not form part of, or result from, an organised plan (they were
individual and mutually exclusive measures) and, secondly, which
followed a course parallel to the circumstances at the time (they
were not formulated because of a primary deﬁcit). In general, it is
inevitable that changes to ﬁscal instruments end up having prac-
tical and political effects but again, this can only be seen in the
medium and long term. By the end of the decade Congress had
voted for tax reform,8 approved reforms restricting social security,
and accepted administrative reforms. One policy initiative was of
6 Ter-Minassian (1997) distinguish fourmain approaches in thedesignof tax rules
coveringall federal levels. Theﬁrst approach is basedon the relianceonmarketdisci-
pline to determine the states of the debt limit. The second comprises the cooperative
approach to debt control, which limits the result of negotiation between the fed-
eral government and subnational governments. The third concerns the control of
subnational borrowing bases with speciﬁc rules in the constitution or by law. And
ﬁnally, the fourth approach refers to the direct control of the central government
over subnational borrowing. It should be noted that some countries may use tech-
niques that cover more than one of these approaches. The work of Tavares et al.
(1999) was developed by the economist team which prepared the basis of the FRL.
The work is quite elucidative to better comprehend such Brazilian innovation.
7 The deﬁcit was a constant factor that was difﬁcult to measure correctly, because
the Brazilian government has always been heavily de-concentrated and decen-
tralised, and in particular because the monetary authorities and even public banks
issued debt and carried out spending in the name of the Treasury – both at a national
and state level (they were all owners of commercial and even development banks)
8 On polemics and failures of recurrent tax reform plans, see Varsano (2003) and
Mendes (2013).
particular importance: the constitutional amendment required the
Executive to send a plan for regulating the article dealing with the
general provision of public ﬁnances. This later became well-known
as the Fiscal Responsibility Law – FRL.9
Among other changes at the end of the last century, one could
mention the privatisation of strategic sectors of the economy; the
renegotiation or rolling on of regional governments’ debts which
were assumed by the National Treasury; legislation regulating the
state tax on goods (ICMS), which provided compensation transfers
from central government to regional government; and the creation
of a simpliﬁed system for collecting tax from small enterprises
(known as the Simples regime); and, lastly, the issuing of an act
which set up a new, responsible ﬁscal system. These changes were
crucial in creating a better future for public ﬁnances, and for the
economy itself (Além & Giambiagi, 2001; Oliveira, 2009).
The banking system was also restructured; federal banks were
cleaned up and reinforced, and almost all state banks were pri-
vatised. Sanitation companies, energy distributors and transport
companies, including subways, passed into private management,
with governments often motivated or forced to carry out this pri-
vatisation in exchange for the federalisation of their debts. Another
legal change in the immediate post-Real period involved the cre-
ation of a simpliﬁed taxation system, known as Simples, for micro
and small businesses. The initiative was led by the federal gov-
ernment, which recognised the enormous bureaucratic complexity
of the Brazilian system. It was a crucial means of formalising
employment and enterprises and accounted for an overwhelming
proportion of new taxpayerswho registeredwith the general social
security scheme.
Still, it is important to mention that until the creation of the
Real, in the middle of 1994, there was very little political propen-
sity towards greater austerity in the public accounts. The Real Plan
was accompanied by two ﬁscal measures: ﬁrstly, the creation of
a tax on ﬁnancial transactions (aiming to enhance revenues) and,
second, the setting aside of a ﬁfth of the revenue from taxes or
contributions to be freely allocated in the budget, regardless of the
original obligation. Thispaved theway for assigninga largerportion
of tax revenue to cover interest on debt.
If on the one hand worse ﬁscal results were recorded in the
ﬁrst years of the Real than those prior to the creation of the cur-
rency, with even the public sector recording a primary deﬁcit,10
on the other hand, some crucial institutional changes were made
at the time to improve the long-term state of public ﬁnances. By
1999, in the wake of the Asian and Ruble crises, Brazil came under
signiﬁcant pressure from foreign investors, concerned at the sus-
tainability of ﬁscal policy and a widening current account gap. The
government’s reaction was to radically change directions, opting
for an inﬂation targeting system. In creating this system, Brazil was
the ﬁrst emerging economy to have this instrument accepted in
the aid program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
previously had stuck to monitoring the imbalance of balances, and
preferred countries to adopt a currency stabilisation fund (currency
board).
Fiscal adjustment came next, and was carried out on two fronts.
Firstly, an ambitious program of ﬁscal adjustment was designed,
under pressure from the IMF, which combined a major increase
in taxes with general cuts to expenditure (although this drastically
9 Therefore, the FRL was administered nationally and at the initiative of parlia-
ment, and not at the instigation of the International Monetary Fund, as the political
opposition alleged at the time. Rather, the Fund itself came to issue an unfavourable
analysis of the draft plan (or on condition that other reforms were carried out
beforehand).
10 For a critical analysis of thedevelopmentof thepublic accounts in the immediate
post-Real period, seeGiambiagi andRonci (2004), Giambiagi (2008), Jaloretto (2009)
and, for more recent years, Almeida (2013).
J.R. Afonso et al. / The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 62 (2016) 41–55 51
reduced investments). The resultswerepublishedandstrictlymon-
itored in order to meet the targets of increasing primary surplus
and stabilising the public sector’s net debt. On the second front,
the federal government sought to adopt measures to avoid ﬁscal
imbalances recurring, with an increase in taxes and cuts to spend-
ing. Although it did not make much progress with taxation and
social security reforms, the government prioritised the publication
of a new general code for public ﬁnances which was supported by
Congress; indeed, it was Congress that took the initiative to ask the
Executive to send a bill to regulate this code which, despite being
stipulated in the 1988 Constitution, had never been debated.
In less than a year, in 2000, a bill to create a responsible ﬁscal
system passed through Congress and was approved by a quorum
sufﬁcient to change even the Constitution (Afonso, 2010). The act is
very broad (it has over 100 articles)11 and, as a supplementary act
which sets general, constitutional regulations, applies to all admin-
istrative bodies in the three spheres of government.
The Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), the ﬁrst of its type
to be adopted by an emerging economy, includes both principles
(such as the balance of the budget in the long term) and speciﬁc
limits, as well as an emphasis on transparency. It only speciﬁes
one restriction, to comply with an express constitutional decision,
which applies to spending on the salary payroll: the maximum
should be 50% of current revenue for central government and 60%
for other governments, with sub-restrictions for powers and bod-
ies, aswell as a prudential limit (which, if exceeded, prohibits wage
increases and hiring). Another oft-cited limit for public debt is reg-
ulated by the FRL, which covers on what basis it will be applied,
how, and how it will be adjusted. The public debt ceiling itself was
ﬁxed at a later date by the Senate, initiated by the President, but
without the powers of veto.
Nowadays the targets for ﬁscal results, and their component
parts (revenue and expenditure, as well as debt and equity), are
ﬁxed annually in an act drawn up by each government – the
yearly Budgetary Directives Act (LDO) which also contains an esti-
mate for the next two years. Throughout the year, periodic checks
are made to see whether the revenue effectively being collected
matches the one initially drafted, and if there is a mismatch a bud-
get sequestration (linear or differentiated, if regulated in the LDO)
is automatically put into effect. It is noteworthy that there are no
national or aggregate goals, as each level of government sets and
pursues its own targets.
The FRL itself includes some get-out clauses, such as exemption
from complying with limits in the event of disaster, low growth
or recession, drastic changes of economic policy or if there is a
request from the Senate Executive. But, being a supplementary act
(it requires a special quorum and cannot be changed by presiden-
tial act), is also applies to regional governments and, traditionally,
is very stable (it cannot be amended by an exclusive act of the Fed-
eral Executive). Furthermore, one pillar of the FRL was to forbid
the central government taking on debts from other governments
or loaning to then directly – a classic problem in a country which
has already experienced successive internal and external morato-
ria of regional governments which have ended up being assumed
by the central government.
The FRL was also accompanied by another act which crim-
inalised breach of the most basic rules, stipulating both loss
of political mandates and even prison. Since it was so all-
encompassing and multifaceted, mixing a code of conduct with
rules, the Brazilian FRL won worldwide recognition as a highly
modernisingpiece of legislation (Ter-Minassian, 2010;WorldBank,
2008).
11 Supplementary Act no. 101 of 4/5/2000; complete text available at: http://bit.
ly/l3pznnq.
In this general overview of events, the introduction of the FRL
can be seen as the act which consolidated or concluded the pro-
cess of institutional changes. In the midst of this, the budgetary
processwas reformulated, revenue, accounting andﬁnance admin-
istration was modernised, most public companies and banks were
privatised, and regional debtswere renegotiatedby the central gov-
ernment, among other things. If after the FRL few advances were
made in changes to ﬁscal legislation, the same is not true for the
ﬁeld of management, where efforts continued to be made to mod-
ernise ﬁscal administration in its very diverse activities. This is
the case, for example, for the national government and most of
the regional governments adopting an integrated system of budget
management, accounting, ﬁnance and equity (known as SIAFI), and
also the use of electronic ﬁscal notes in taxation (the issue involves
an on-line record in treasury checks), reducing costs for taxpay-
ers and making the work of tax-collection organisations easier and
more efﬁcient.
Brazilian ﬁscal management is particular to a democracy and
a relatively autonomous federation. Each unit of government,
national or regional, prepares, estimates and approves its own
budget and, at the end of the ﬁnancial year, its statement of
accounts. Each government has the authority to legislate, charge
and collect its taxes, and also to regularly receive and dispose
of revenue distribution guaranteed constitutionally. Each govern-
ment can freely hire ofﬁcials and determine their wages, buy
goods and services, and also contract labour and, lastly, each gov-
ernment can decide freely to contract debts. In this context, the
ﬁscal system does not follow a basic direction formulated from
the centre; goals are set and pursued freely, without standardis-
ation.
It is up to the federal government to try to exercise some control
by means of discretionary recourses, namely voluntary transfers
and loans, in collaboration with state banks or multilateral organi-
sations, with National Treasury guarantee. In practice, since most
regional governments still owe a lot to the Treasury itself on
account of the different ﬁnancing schemes implemented before the
FRLwasbroughtout, thekeyvariable innationalﬁscalmanagement
is the service of renegotiated debt. In this case, default is not per-
mitted (the Treasury can block and withdraw cash directly from
the individual coffers of a debtor government which does not pay
on time), and the volume of payments is so high that it ensures, in
and of itself, that the regional governments will make a substan-
tial primary surplus (the regional governments paid the Union the
equivalent of 0.78% of GDP in return for these operations in 2013).
In practice, the regional primary surplus only gets worse if the cen-
tral government grants these governments the ability to contract
new credit operations. Another aspect of this situation is the grow-
ing criticism, particularly from political scientists, that the country
paradoxically is experiencing a new wave of political centralisa-
tion, as regional governments’ room for manoeuvre in ﬁscal terms
is very limited (Ismael, 2013).
After such several institutional andﬁscal reforms, by 2011Brazil
could reap the rewards of a then spectacularly favourable external
setting, with the strongest commodities price boom of the post-
World War period. This allowed Brazil to generate the best growth
rates of recent decades, albeit driven mostly by consumption and
by expanding internal credit.
In some ways, we can recognise that this more favourable
economic setting was an important factor in the government’s
then lack of interest in maintaining the momentum of legislative
changes, despite enjoying a substantial parliamentarymajority and
widespread popular support; it simply did not seem necessary. As
such, while the last decade and a half has not seen any changes
which could be labelled structural reforms, the period has seen the
display of the best performances yet in traditional ﬁscal indicators.
Inparticular, the targets forgeneratinga signiﬁcantprimary surplus
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Fig. 2. Overall post-war gross tax burden: 1947–2013 (in % of GDP).
Source: Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil.
in the public sector and reducing net borrowing were successively
met (IMF, 2013; OECD, 2001).
The good performance of ﬁscal indicators, however, was accom-
panied by changes in the proﬁle of the main variables. Despite no
longer having to respond to external or ﬁscal crises, as in the recent
past, the overall tax burden remains high and is increasing, which
has in addition allowed public spending to grow and to therefore
create the highest primary surplus in the last two decades. It was
not by chance that public debt, conventionally measured by the
concept of borrowing and which counts the central bank, atyp-
ically, as part of the public sector, fell to the point where it set
off the accumulation of foreign reserves from the middle of the
last decade. Since Brazil collects indicators for the whole public
sector and includes the central bank, the reserves are deducted
from the liabilities and thus foreign debt becomes negative, with a
strong correlation between net borrowing and the exchange rate:
paradoxically, incidents of maxi-depreciation reduce public debt
drastically, while incidents of appreciation cause it to rise. It is
an unusual situation and radically different from that of other
countries.
Social policy has become active, and has gained central impor-
tance in theﬁscal setting,which in the pastwas limited to a concern
for generating sufﬁcient economy to meet debt commitments, par-
ticularly foreign debt. In the nineties, the priority was for universal
public services, with decentralisation of primary education and the
healthcare system. Already in the past decade, the focus has shifted
to beneﬁts, both social security (beneﬁtted by real increases in the
minimumwage,which paysmore than half of the pensioners in the
general scheme), and welfare beneﬁts – timely, incipient income
transfer programswere consolidated in the family allowance (Serra
& Afonso, 2007b).
With the necessary costing increased for management of these
policies, social spending has more than doubled in two decades
and today reaches levels much more comparable to the European
welfare state than to emerging Asian or Latin American countries.
Currently, calculating all the costs and the three spheres of gov-
ernment, it is close to 25% of GDP. It is interesting that in order to
ﬁnance such high social spending, a high tax burden has become
both inevitable and necessary. The most remarkable thing is that
the national tax revenue grew in relation to GDP until the latter
slowed down or declined (Fig. 2 shows this post-Real develop-
ment).
Brazil takes advantage of its tax potential in a way that few
other countries, including wealthy ones, do, partly because of its
effectiveness in generating indirect tax revenues. With an eco-
nomic organisationmarkedby a business concentration that is high
and still rising, the application of high value added tax rates on
strategic inputs (such as fuel, energy and communications) and
even taxes on bank transactions, Brazil is very efﬁcient at reap-
ing indirect taxes. This tax-collection success is also the result of
long and sizable investments in the modernisation of tax admin-
istration, which today has recourse to technological resources on
a par with those of the most advanced economies and with rela-
tively reduced costs. For instance, 100% of income tax declarations,
even of individuals, are ﬁlled out electronically and submitted
online.
Advances in how tax collection is carried out have a rather dam-
aging counterpart, namely a heavy reliance on regressive taxes in
a society already marked by deep concentration of income and
wealthbefore taxandwhich, after tax, becomesevenmoreunequal.
The collection impetus is not replicated in direct taxes, as is clearly
shown by the fact that tax collection on urban real estate prop-
erty (Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano – IPTU) is less than a
third of tax on car ownership (Imposto sobre veículo automotor
IPVA), while no tax at all is collected on undeveloped land tax
(ITR). The large concentration of government revenue in the cen-
tral government is also a problem to be faced by the country. Local
governments are dependent on transfers from the central govern-
ment. Fig. 3 shows the historical distribution of these resources
after carrying out transfers.
Even in the case of income tax it is difﬁcult to reach the very
rich and even many middle-class professionals, as they do not
receive income as individuals (and are not, therefore, subject to
the progressive table) but rather as individual ﬁrms (subject to a
much lower burden and with an equal rate, regardless of income),
a phenomenon prevalent in the Brazilian private sector more gen-
erally which is likely to intensify more than in other economies
(and which is the result of applying an excessively high tax bur-
den on work and in general). Despite these different examples,
ﬁscal fairness is a subject ignored and even avoided in national
debate, both political and even academic – strangely, it arouses
more interest abroad, asBrazil is notorious for beingoneof themost
unequal countries in theworld (Rezende, Afonso, Gaiger, & Ferreira,
2013).
In the context of the accelerated economic growth experienced
up to 2012, ﬁscal performance was the best in decades, and it was
no surprise that the reform agenda lost priority. The original ﬁs-
cal reform elements introduced during the eight years following
the 1993 introduction of the Real Plan remained in place while
the Lula and Rousseff administrations (2003 to the present day)
accomplished little reform of their own.
However, since 2012, with the emergence of recession in Brazil
amid a slump in global commodity prices, any room for compla-
cency or policy inertia has been removed. Macroeconomic policy
yielded undeniable and easy results in the short term, through
the support and after the strong expansion of consumption, and
managed to successfully transform recession accelerated growth,
left, however, new traps without solving old challenges (like low
investment rate of the economy and particularly of governments,
and the high level of public debt, the international concept). Much
of the credit recovery in the country after the crisis was led by
public banks, but to do so, they needed to fundraise exceptionally
with the National Treasury, which, in turn, made at the expense
of expanding public debt; and this expansion was absorbed by the
ﬁnancial market who preferred to concentrate its investments in
short-term (through so-called repurchase agreements). Thus, the
ﬁrst trap is thegovernment’s temptation to raise extraordinarynew
loans at the cost of higher debt whenever you encounter a greater
difﬁculty to offer credit or even to generate revenue and meet the
ﬁscal target. The worst of traps may be narrow ﬁscal space result-
ing from the reduction in interest rates because increasingly SELIC
fails to express the average cost of federal government debt before
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Fig. 3. Tax revenue appropriation after intergovernmental transfers.
Source: Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil.
increasing and huge stocks of assets and liabilities, with remu-
neration rates and maturities as diverse – as detailed in Afonso
(2011).12
Bringing the discussion to a close we consider the prospects
for a renewal of the reform process against this more challenging
backdrop.
6. Concluding remarks
This analysis has sought to demonstrate the relevance of insti-
tutions as they have affected monetary and ﬁscal policy and the
stabilisation of the Brazilian economy following the creation of the
Real in the mid-1990s.
Despite the relative success achieved, it is important to bear in
mind that the processes involved – from the formulation of the
monetary and ﬁscal instruments mentioned, to their implemen-
tation and consolidation – did not result from prior appropriate
strategic planning. The institutional reforms were, in general, car-
ried out in response to a succession of internal and, principally,
external crises. Theneed to facebotheconomic and structural crises
allowed different governments to approve important legislative
changes in the National Congress, as well as amendments to the
Constitution enacted shortly before in October 1988. The cycles of
institutional reforms ofmonetary and public ﬁnance did not, there-
fore, result from an organised plan, country, or even government,
but were imposed by dint of circumstances.
Perhaps surprisingly then, in the wake of the great global ﬁnan-
cial crisis of 2008–2009 Brazil broke with its historical tradition of
facing a crisis with institutional reforms of its monetary and ﬁscal
policy frameworks. Eschewing such reforms, the government set
in motion expansionary ﬁscal policy, ﬁrst to exit the global crisis,
then to accelerate growth. The latter then stagnated and fell well
behind the average for emerging countries. Current expenditure, in
12 The gap between the revenues with extraordinary claims and the cost of
the securities debt came to add to the effects of charging cost of international
reserves and public debt management which, after pointing downward trend of
the Selic, started to put more and more titles preﬁxed. Thus, the average rate
SELIC dropped from 12.5 to 9.8 points between 2008 and 2010 and the reﬂec-
tion was almost nil on expenditures with nominal interest of the public sector
(from 5.5% to 5.3% of GDP). Last year, the implicit rate of total net debt stood
at 14.9 points, almost ﬁve points above the Selic rate, reﬂecting the mismatch
between debt paying 10.1 points against credits that earn 4.3 points. See Afonso
(2011, p. 14).
particular social security and welfare beneﬁts, continued to
increase, ahead of the economy and tax collection (Almeida, 2013).
The government also continued to supply credit to the rest of
the economy through state-owned banks. Fiscal beneﬁts rapidly
multiplied, from tax waiver to credit subsidies (Afonso & Diniz,
2014).
By the start of 2015, following further poor growth perfor-
mance and a surge in inﬂation, it had become evident that the
freeze on fresh reform could not continue. With the appoint-
ment of a macroeconomically orthodox Finance Minister (Joaquim
Levy) and the adoption of a more demanding primary surplus
target the climate for change appears more propitious. Possibly
the greatest challenge for the Brazilian economy today is to re-
start precisely that process of institutional reform, last carried out
at the end of the previous century, and which now serves as a
benchmark for other emerging economies. There is no longer any
doubt that sustained economic growth led by the growth of con-
sumption has its limits, and the most it has achieved today is
preventing an even deeper recession. A combination of increasing
inﬂationary pressure (even after the rise in basic Real-dominated
interest rates), theeconomy’sworst external results in thepost-war
period, and a signiﬁcant reduction in the public sector’s primary
surplus, suggest that the Brazilian macroeconomic tripod stands
endangered.
The consensus that new institutional arrangements are neces-
sary is growing, gradually. To start with, there is an increasingly
pressingmatter to deal with – a prerequisite, even – before review-
ing individual policies. This relates to the fragile co-ordination of
macroeconomic policies: there seems to be a lack of any organised
set-up to improve interaction between the different economic
authorities responsible for this. Practice has been marked by some-
what autonomous management by the institution responsible for
each segment of economic policy (such as monetary policy, tax col-
lection, management of expenditure and debt), without any formal
process for integrating activities. A return to a concernwithmacro-
economic consistency is much needed within the policy arena, in
ofﬁcial research studies, and within academia. In a government in
which there is no lack of professional bodies for various ﬁelds of
activity, it is strange that there is no ofﬁcial body taskedwith bring-
ing together, integrating and co-coordinating the authorities and
the policies involved in Brazilian macroeconomic policymaking.
The more troubled the outlook for a vigorous ﬁscal agreement,
the greater thepossibility –or even theneed– for agendasof reform
of the ﬁscal institutions in Brazil to be taken up once again. There
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is no lack of opportunities, from the taxation system or budget sys-
tem to the ﬁscal responsibility law itself (which has not yet been
fully regulated). But the ﬁrst change should be in the strategy of
the federal government which, since the rise of the Workers’ Party,
has opted for a minimalist approach, fearing the reaction of parlia-
ment, despite the fact it has always enjoyed a broad and growing
majority.
Paradoxically, Brazil’s past experience, which could ultimately
serve as a lesson for other emerging countries, must now become a
point of reference for the country itself – a country which faces
the enormous challenge of building a new macroeconomic pol-
icy framework ﬁt for its future. For the outside world, the great
question is: amidst this remarkable duality, will Brazil become a
model in public ﬁnances, in monetary policy and even in feder-
alism for other economies, in particular emerging or developing
economies? Every case is different, but it is hoped that some lessons
from Brazil’s experience may be considered by other countries, not
only in relation to what course of action to take, but in particular,
what to avoid.
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